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A CRISIS OF FAITH & THE SCIENTIFIC 
FUTURE OF PATENT THEORY 
OSKAR LIIVAK† 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, utilitarian rationales have formed the 
core foundation on which the United States patent system is 
built.  Yet, more than ever before, that foundation appears 
untenably shaky.  In 1958, the Senate hoped to gauge the 
performance of the patent system.  It tasked economist Fritz 
Machlup with providing a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of 
it.  Machlup undertook the project, filed the report, and 
concluded with his now-famous assessment: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on 
the basis of our present knowledge of its economic 
consequences, to recommend instituting [it].  But since we have 
had [one] for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis 
of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.1 
Such indeterminate support surely caused concern but then 
again, at least at that time, perhaps we just had not developed 
the sophistication to make a full assessment.  Indeed, as late as 
1986, George Priest lamented that “[t]he ratio of empirical 
demonstration to assumption in [patent] literature must be very 
close to zero.”2  Maybe it was okay if the jury was out on the 
patent system because maybe the data was still out, too. 
 
† Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. © 2016 Oskar Liivak. For valuable 
comments and suggestions, the author thanks Jeremy Sheff and the participants of 
the St. John’s Intellectual Property Law Center’s symposium on Values, Questions, 
and Methods in Intellectual Property. 
1 See SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT 
SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (review written by Fritz Machlup) [hereinafter 
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM]. 
2 George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual 
Property: Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE 
ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 19 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. 
eds., 1986). 
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Today, thirty years after Priest made those comments, a lot 
has changed.3  Many researchers from law and from economics 
have made it their life’s work to study and empirically measure 
the patent system.4  Yet, despite that outpouring of effort, the 
overall picture is, as put by Mark Lemley, “complicated.”5  We 
still have no proof that definitively refutes or supports the 
system, and we are still just “muddl[ing] through.”6  But now, 
with all that effort expended, the ambivalence cannot be ignored.  
What was once a nagging concern is now an inescapable alarm. 
What to do and where to turn during a crisis is never easy.  
Assessing our options certainly seems prudent.  In his book 
Justifying Intellectual Property, Robert Merges does just that.  He 
opens the book explaining, “Every time I . . . go looking for the 
utilitarian footings of the field, I come up empty.”7  Rather than 
drop support for intelletual property altogether, Merges leaves 
behind its traditional utilitarian roots and instead aims to 
understand and justify intellectual property as a “fundamental 
right” as understood by Rawls, Waldron, Locke, and Kant.8  In 
many ways, the book is his reaction to the current utilitarian 
impasse.  As he had been a scholar who often employed law and 
economics rationales, that new, decidedly nonutilitarian focus 
was surprising, and apparently it was surprising even to Merges 
himself.9 
In part in reaction to Merges’s comments, Mark Lemley 
published a recent essay decrying any abandonment of 
utilitarian foundations for intellectual property.10  His essay has 
provoked something of a minor firestorm in the usually placid 
world of intellectual property scholars.11  Lemley’s primary 
concern with the shift from utilitarian arguments to more 
 
3 Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 
1332 (2015) (“In the past three decades there has been an unprecedented—indeed, 
astonishing—outpouring of sophisticated empirical work on virtually every aspect of 
IP law and innovative and creative markets.”). 
4 See id. 
5 Id. at 1334. 
6 See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 80. 
7 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2011). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 4. 
10 See generally Lemley, supra note 3. 
11 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Lemley on Faith-Based IP (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/04/lemley-on-faith-based-ip.html 
(cataloging the responses to the essay). 
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fundamental rights is the lack of any limiting principles that will 
produce a balanced compromise between disparate competing 
interests.12  For him: 
A utilitarian IP framework has a metric for deciding whether 
we should give control over those terms to the people who claim 
them.  But if IP is a Right, granted to the first creator not for a 
purpose but simply because they are first, it is hard to find a 
similar limiting principle.13 
Furthermore, Lemley supports utilitarian foundations over a 
rights-based system because a rights-based approach is “not a 
science[;] . . . it does not admit the prospect of being proven 
wrong.”14  He added that he is trying to draw the line “between 
theories of IP that are responsive to evidence and those that are 
impervious to it.”15 
It is Lemley’s call for a falsifiable, scientific utilitarian 
theory that is the focus of this Essay.  I wholeheartedly agree 
that we should endeavor to provide such a utilitarian theory for 
the patent system.  But this Essay argues that this call is more 
radical than it appears.  If we want a proof-based system around 
which consensus could grow, then we have to abandon the 
incentive-focused, regulatory model that is today’s standard.  
That theory is based on an “intractable cost-benefit analysis that 
resists either justification or, alternatively, falsification.”16  
Although clad in the trappings of a cost-benefit analysis, the 
theory has no hope of ever being determinate, and accordingly, it 
should be jettisoned.  Try as we might, the framing of the patent 
system as a market-skewing intervention inherently precludes 
the theory from achieving the sought after falsifiability. 
 
12 But see MERGES, supra note 7, at 159 (dedicating a significant portion of his 
book to a central “Proportionality Principle” that puts bounds on intellectual 
property and prevents “excessive” leverage). 
13 See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1341. Though not the focus here, I disagree that 
such nonutilitarian thinking leads inexorably to the ever increasing reach of 
intellectual property. Elsewhere I have argued—along with my co-author Eduardo 
Peñalver—that arguments based on autonomy, personhood, and efficiency all 
provide limits for intellectual property. See generally Oskar Liivak & Eduardo 
Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
1437 (2013). 
14 Lemley, supra note 3, at 1346. 
15 Id. at 1345. 
16 Oskar Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 
1335, 1337 (2013) [hereinafter Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity]. 
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Unsettling as this is, this failure of proof for the current 
patent theory should not surprise us.  Actually, we should be 
surprised that we ever thought our current theory could be 
justified.  The fact is that we picked a pathologically defective 
framing for our patent system.  As is conventionally understood 
today, the system is seen as exclusive rights that aim to reward 
inventors so that they are “artificially” drawn into the world of 
inventing.17  Patents are seen as a government mediated reward 
to induce optimal amounts of inventive activity and that reward 
is funded by taxing those that infringe the patent rights.  This is 
a foundational notion that, if noted at all anymore, is seen as 
surely correct and uncontroverted. 
But the current reward via exclusion framing is deeply 
problematic.  Once we start down that road, where the very 
purpose is to distort private decision making, we have sealed our 
fate and we are heading for unresolvable indeterminism.  Our 
inability to prove or disprove the utilitarian balance for such a 
system was preordained by our framing.  With “artificial” 
inducement as the stated goal, important utilitarian metrics are 
taken off the table.  The price system is not available to measure 
and justify the patent system because we have purposefully 
distorted it.  It is no wonder that patent controversy has not been 
resolved and that we are at best still just “muddl[ing] through.”18 
This Essay takes aim at this inducement framing, and it lays 
bare its pathologies, explaining that, by inducing invention, we 
will not be able to make any meaningful assessments of the costs 
and benefits of the system.  There is no doubt that the business 
of invention and innovation is complex, but by framing patents as 
inducement we have made that job near impossible. 
There are several fatal flaws with this understanding.  First, 
on a macroeconomic level, the inducement system requires 
knowing how much invention or innovation society wants.  
Certainly, most agree that we want some positive amount of 
innovation, but beyond that, it is anyone’s guess.  The designers 
of an inducement-focused patent system need to know—at least 
on a macro level—the optimal amount, but nobody has that 
information.  When someone is drawn away from otherwise 
productive activity by the lure of the patent, how much has 
 
17 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 8 (2009). 
18 See ECONOMIC REVIEW OF PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 80. 
FINAL_LIIVAK 2/23/2017  4:45 PM 
2016] SCIENTIFIC FUTURE OF PATENT THEORY 643 
society lost?19  This design parameter is different in kind from 
those needed in the rest of the economy.  A central advantage of 
the private property market is that we need not know such 
relative allocations beforehand in designing the system.  Instead, 
they result from decentralized decision making based on the 
price system.  In short, inducement is generally not the central 
design feature elsewhere in the economy.  Instead, the amount of 
activity in an industry is an output result of the neutral private 
property platform. 
Second, even if the optimum level of innovation is not 
knowable ex ante, it perhaps could be identified through trial 
and error.  By selecting a random positive level, then measuring 
the resulting costs and benefits, the level of innovation can be 
adjusted to optimize the net benefit by trial and error.  But this 
is near impossible with the current inducement-framing system.  
We do not have the tools to measure the costs and benefits on a 
micro or macro level.  Again, because the pricing of patent 
transactions is no longer tied to alternate uses of scarce 
resources, the costs and benefits of this system cannot be 
calculated.  The system as a whole remains without solid footing. 
Third and lastly, though the overall balance is near 
impossible to calculate, reward framing appears to involve real 
costs without guaranteeing any real benefits.  First, there is the 
deadweight loss.  Reward framing often leads to a fixation on 
exclusion.  It is thought that a proper patent reward generally 
must exclude some from using the invention.  Otherwise, the 
patentee could not receive his proper reward.  This limit on 
access is the cost side of the famous incentive-versus-access 
compromise that is at the core of intellectual property debates.  
Excluding others is seen as necessary yet it also condemns the 
system to incurring at least this deadweight cost. 
In addition, this exclusion focus has its most pernicious 
impact on actual innovators.  The patent system allows patentees 
to tax independent innovators even where the patentee has not 
engaged in any attempts to commercialize.  In short, actual 
innovators are being taxed to provide tribute to patentees who 
are often not innovating.  Much of the “troll problem” can be seen 
as aggresively leveraging this feature.  With inducement 
 
19 See Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 
ECONOMICA 30, 41–44 (1934) (arguing that a subsidy vision of patents has nonzero 
yet hard to quantify opportunity costs). 
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framing, the dynamic costs are considerable.20  Innovation, where 
new inventions are actually utilized, does provide real societal 
benefits.  But today’s inducement framing never requires that 
patentees engage in any actual innovation.  In fact, the 
incentives may be aligning against real innovators.  Today, 
noninnovators are increasingly taxing actual innovators.  This 
hardly seems like a system that can guarantee any societal 
benefits.  We know this framing is incurring real costs to society, 
but we cannot be confident about any benefits. 
So if inducement inherently introduces so many problems, is 
it necessary?  Is inducement the only way to frame the patent 
system?  This Essay argues, no, we do not need to induce and we 
should not want to.  There are other theories for the patent 
system that do not fall prey to the same pathologies.  Though the 
goal still should be to “promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and 
useful [a]rts,”21 we need not fulfill that goal by directly 
subsidizing invention.  Rather, a patent system should remain 
agnostic as to participation.  It should not try to induce people to 
invent or innovate.  Instead, the patent system should be a 
neutral platform that is available for inventors to sell their 
wares—that is, their inventions—to technology users.  When 
someone decides that the best use of his or her time is to invent 
and sell the technology to others, then this platform should be 
available for them.  This allows private decision making to guide 
participation.  The system should be available to support those 
that decide that they can create and sell a new invention to 
enough people that the cumulative revenue makes inventing the 
best use of their time and resources.  Likewise, the system should 
be available for technology consumers who decide to get new 
technology when the utility from using the new technology 
exceeds the value of the other things that could have been bought 
with the requested licensing fee.  There are numerous 
advantages of building our understanding of the patent system 
around such a neutral technology transfer market.22 
First, in this view, the patent system does not induce or 
subsidize.  Professional inventors and technology users will 
employ the system when such an ex ante technological exchange 
 
20 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 247, 262–63 (1994) (outlining the various costs of a patent system). 
21 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
22 See Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, supra note 16, at 1353. 
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inherently benefits both parties.  Importantly, because the 
system is not aiming to distort or subsidize, then the price 
system can operate to align private decision making with societal 
decision making.  In other words, the system is designed so that 
private decision making aligns with society’s cost-benefit 
analysis.  Wherever a professional inventor can stay in business 
by selling his or her inventions to others, then society will concur 
that the creation and commercialization of that technology was 
the best use of that inventor’s scarce resources.  Importantly, 
because it is a neutral platform, the design of the system does not 
need to know the optimal amount of inventive activity ex ante.  
The resulting amount of inventive activity is an output of the 
system rather than a necessary initial input.  We are not trying 
to artificially divert people to this system.  Instead, they will 
participate when the best use of their time and scarce resources 
is inventing and innovating. 
In addition, with a technology transfer focus, deadweight 
loss is a bug, rather than an unfortunate but necessary feature.  
In the current inducement-via-exclusion framing, deadweight 
loss is seen as an unfortunate but largely unavoidable feature.  
As famously put by Kenneth Arrow, “In a free enterprise 
economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention 
to create property rights; precisely to the extent that it is 
successful, there is an underutilization of the information.”23  
With an innovation focus, a potential user without access to the 
technology is not an unfortunate, necessary feature, but rather a 
market failure that should be remedied. 
The following aims to expand and detail these arguments.  
Part I provides the conventional incentive narrative for the 
patent system.  It lays out the ambiguous support for that system 
and then it shows how that ambiguity derives in large part from 
its framing as a system of inducement.  Part II takes the 
diagnosis from Part I and aims to build a patent system that 
avoids those pitfalls.  It describes a neutral system of ex ante 
technology exchange.  Importantly, such a system does not 
induce, but rather enables such technology transfers by 
regulating—and often prohibiting—the acts that would harm a 
business model based on technology creation and transfer. 
 
23 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 617 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962). 
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I. INDUCEMENT AND ITS PATHOLOGIES 
This Part outlines the conventional inducement framing of 
the patent system, then enumerates three of its major 
deficiencies.  First, the inducement narrative necessarily involves 
determining ex ante the optimal amount of innovative activity 
and the reward that will induce that activity.  The parameters 
for these critical functions are unknown.  From the outset, this 
system is based on unknown variables.  Second, even admitting 
that choosing an ex ante level of reward is guesswork, the 
conventional framing precludes any cost-benefit assessment that 
might allow a trial and error search that could converge toward 
an optimum amount of innovative activity.  Lastly, the 
inducement framing is fixated on exclusion.  Though no one 
celebrates excluding others as being desirable, the reward 
framing sees exclusion as the necessary—and even tragic—price 
for providing the incentives that induce. 
A.  The Conventional Inducement Narrative 
Most policy justifications for the patent system begin by 
noting that the informational goods at the heart of the patent 
system are inherently different than tangible goods.  Once 
created, an informational good can be copied rather easily.24  This 
makes creation and sale of such goods complicated.  Every 
purchaser of the good can turn around to become a competitor.  
Without some kind of regulation, copying and reselling—that is, 
piracy—is too attractive.  The worry is that, in such a world, too 
few will risk investing scarce resources in such a tenuous 
business model.  As a result, “[i]f we [do not] do 
something . . . everyone will want to be an imitator, not an 
inventor.”25 
 
 
 
24 This has been emphasized for some time now. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson, President, U.S., to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) (“[The] peculiar 
character [of an idea] is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses 
the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without 
darkening me. That ideas should freely spread . . . seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature . . . .”). 
25 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 17, at 7–8. 
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From those correct observations, though, the argument 
moves quickly to the assertion that society must affirmatively 
“encourage invention by rewarding inventors.”26  The patent 
system is seen as “deliberate government interventions in the 
market—a sort of mercantilist economic policy for artificially 
stimulating innovation.”27  The reward aims to induce people to 
invent.  Patents give out “above-market rewards to creators of 
certain works that would not be created, or not created as soon or 
as well, in the absence of reward.”28  Within this discourse there 
is debate surrounding what activities are to be rewarded and 
what institutions are best situated to grant and manage the 
reward, but the notion of inducing via a monetary reward is 
surely agreed upon. 
As to processes for administering the reward, there are a 
number of choices.  A reward to inventors could be administered 
through a prize system, a grant system, a tax break system, or an 
exclusive rights system.  There is long-standing discourse on the 
comparative advantages of these different modes.29  The United 
States Constitution specifically enumerates that Congress should 
promote progress via “exclusive [r]ight[s],”30 thus, much of the 
discourse has largely remained focused on patents and their 
exclusive rights.  In recent years, there has been a notable 
renaissance exploring these alternatives.31 
In a prize system, a prize amount is chosen to induce the 
optimal amount of innovative activity.  As argued below, it is 
generally unknown how much innovative activity is optimal or 
how much reward is needed to induce that activity for a reward-
focused patent system, and the administration is slightly 
different.  The system still needs to determine the optimal level 
of activity that the system aims to induce.  Rather than turning 
to the general treasury to fund the prize, the patent system funds 
the patent reward by granting valuable rights of exclusion to the 
 
26 Id. at 8. 
27 Id. 
28 MERGES, supra note 7, at 2. 
29 See, e.g., Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, 
Prizes, and Research Contracts, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 (1983); see also Fritz 
Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. 
ECON. HIST. 1, 10–11, 19–20 (1950). 
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
31 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes 
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2013). 
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patentee.  With these, the patentee taxes those that infringe on 
the rights granted by the patent.  The patentee “is thus ‘akin to a 
private attorney general’ who, aided by the courts, goes forth and 
scours the countryside collecting from infringers the tax that is 
owed to him.”32 
One advantage of this exclusionary prize system is that the 
prize is adjusted automatically.  Because the reward is realized 
by taxing those who infringe the patented technology, the reward 
varies based on the popularity and relevance of the patented 
technology.  If a patent covers important technology that many 
want access to, then the patentee can recover a large reward via 
patent exclusion.  If the technology has no adherents or is of no 
value, that will be reflected in its reward.  This feature allows the 
patent system to be a reward system wherein the reward is not 
fixed beforehand to a set amount.  The doctrine of claim’s scope 
allows the system to reward patentees with larger prizes that 
correspond to the merits of the “real contribution” of the inventor. 
There is considerable debate over the exact acts that need to 
be promoted, as well as what institution is best suited to do the 
promoting.  Despite the diversity of opinion, they have more in 
common than is often admitted.  For example, though an 
exclusive rights system and a prize system surely have 
differences in detailed implementation, they are both, at their 
core, reward systems that aim to induce innovation and 
invention.  They both subsidize and thereby induce people to 
engage in technological progress.  The difference lies in how the 
promised subsidy is defined and how the reward can be collected. 
But even when we focus on inducement via exclusionary 
rights, there is still a further debate over what particular acts 
should be promoted.  Generally, inventors and innovators aim to 
advance science and technology.  But within that broad area, 
details are often murky and terms are used with imprecision.  
The buzzwords of invention and innovation are often bandied 
about interchangeably, but there are differences between the 
two.  As used here, invention relates to the act of conceiving a 
technological solution to a particular problem.  Discovering a 
solution is certainly a positive step but achieving societal benefits 
 
32 Oskar Liivak, Private Law and the Future of Patents, HARV. J.L. & TECH 
(forthcoming 2017) (quoting Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” 
Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 532–33 (2014)). 
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requires more than conceiving a solution alone.33  In general, 
society benefits only when a technological solution is put into 
practice.  If someone conceives of a cheaper, better process to 
produce something, that is great from the standpoint of human 
knowledge, but real societal improvement only occurs when that 
knowledge is put into practice.  That act, taking technology that 
has been invented and putting it into widespread practice, is 
innovation.34  The distinction between invention and innovation 
is relevant to the discussion of patent reward because there are 
ongoing disputes about the exact act that should be rewarded.35 
But even with the ongoing debates about what acts we are 
trying to induce via a reward, there is agreed-upon logic 
underlying these inducement framing of the patent theories.  
Without doing something to help inventors, the “normal” market 
will not consistently and regularly provide remuneration to 
inventors for their efforts.  Being an inventor will just not pay 
the bills and fewer people will invent.  The most obvious solution 
is to simply make inventing more profitable to make up for the 
shortfall. 
In theory, the utilitarian accounting for this system is also 
straightforward.  The benefits are netted against the cost with 
the hope that the results are positive.  “The gains from this 
scheme, in the form of new works created, are weighed against 
social losses, typically in the form of the consumer welfare lost 
when embodiments of these works are sold at prices above the 
marginal cost of their production.”36  But as described throughout 
this Essay, this task has proved to be quite hard in practice.37 
 
33 Of course, there can be positive social benefits just from coming up with a 
solution even before that solution is put in practice. Knowing that a problem has 
been solved can spur others to look for alternate solutions within the same general 
area. Furthermore, knowing how a problem was solved can spur others to apply the 
same rationale to some related area. These are both beneficial spillovers that could 
result simply from coming with a solution even before that technological solution is 
put into widespread practice. 
34 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, 
AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 85 (1939) (stating that 
invention alone without actual usage is “without importance to economic analysis”). 
35 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. 
ECON. 265, 268 (1977); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for 
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703, 707 (2001); Mark A. Lemley, 
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
129, 131 (2004). 
36 MERGES, supra note 7, at 2. 
37 See supra Introduction. 
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B. Pathologies of Inducement 
As argued by Hovenkamp and Bohannon, “finding the right 
balance [for intellectual property] has proven to be one of the 
most difficult questions that government policy has ever had to 
face.”38  So far, there is no evidence that we are converging on a 
solution to this challenge.  Though this lack of justification is 
dispiriting, it should not be surprising.  A reward-based exclusive 
rights system is pathologically defective.  It aims to induce the 
optimal amount of innovative activity.  And we are simply not 
equipped to design such a system.  Though its utilitarian 
contours are easy to define in theory, in practice, we have been 
asking too much of ourselves.  As noted by Merges, designing 
such a system is “impossibly complex.”39  “Estimating costs and 
benefits [in this system] . . . are all overwhelmingly complicated 
tasks.”40 
Whether the reward is mediated directly or through an 
award of exclusive rights, at least at the macro level, such a 
system needs to set the optimal amount of innovative activity as 
an input to system design.  But we just do not have the tools to 
determine how much innovative activity society needs.  Surely it 
is a positive amount, but the exact positive amount is unknown.  
Importantly, these types of determinations are not made for 
other parts of the economy.  Optimal amounts of activity devoted 
to various industries and particular endeavors are the end 
results of the private property-mediated market system.  The 
system produces those natural outputs; they are not required as 
necessary informational parameters for system design.  Even 
though directly rewarding inventors may well seem like the 
obvious way to implement a system “[t]o promote the [p]rogress 
of [s]cience and useful [a]rts,”41 that framing puts an unknowable 
parameter as a core design variable. 
There are other related pathologies as well.  It is conceivable 
that if the system allowed for adjustment, the optimal amount of 
innovative activity could be discovered by repeated trial and 
error.  But this, too, is impossible as we lack the means to assess 
the costs and benefits of the system.  Here, the pathology of the 
 
38 CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 404 (2012). 
39 MERGES, supra note 7, at 2. 
40 Id. 
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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reward framing again rears its ugly head.  Elsewhere in the 
economy, critical decisions about how to use scarce resources are 
generally made in a decentralized fashion, guided primarily by 
the price system.42  Importantly, where the price system is 
working, those observable price signals and transactions are tied 
to the revealed consumer preferences for various uses of our 
collective scarce resources. 
Such beneficial metrics are not available with an 
inducement-based patent system.  They have been largely taken 
off the table because the inducement system specifically distorted 
them.  Patents are trying to “artificially” inflate the value of 
inventing.  In such a world, the prices that are paid for patent 
licenses bear no connection to a revealed preference between use 
of the technology and the alternate uses of scarce resources.  
Instead, as described above, a patent license is just part of a 
larger scheme whereby the patentee collects the patent reward 
by taxing individuals who knowingly or unwittingly infringe.  
Without a functioning price system, it is near impossible to 
measure either the costs or benefits of the system.  The only area 
where headway has been made is in calculating the private costs 
of using the patent system by focusing on the legal fees 
associated with the patent system.43  These audits of the patent 
system are contested, but nonetheless, the existence of real 
numbers and debate is an improvement.  Sadly, that represents 
but one aspect of the total costs and benefits of the patent 
system, and thus, a fuller accounting is just not possible.  Much 
of the blame for that indeterminacy results from having framed 
the system as a reward to induce. 
In addition to these pathologies, the standard reward 
framing puts an unnecessary and unfortunate focus on excluding 
others as the hallmark of a properly functioning system.  In the 
 
42 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS, PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 292 (11th ed. 2010) (“[A] market system uses prices to coordinate economic 
activity[, instead of centralized planning].”). 
43 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 16 (2008) (“By almost any 
interpretation, the United States patent system could not be providing overall 
positive incentives for these United States public firms by the end of the 1990s. The 
risk of patent litigation that firms faced in their capacity as technology adopters 
simply outstripped the profits that they made by virtue of owning 
patents. . . . Moreover, preliminary data for more recent years suggest that this 
problem has gotten worse since 1999.”). 
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conventional reward framing, the “natural” baseline for ideas has 
them freely shared with prices set to marginal cost—therefore 
close to zero.  As famously put by Kenneth Arrow, “[A]ny 
information obtained, say a new method of production, should, 
from the welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart 
from the cost of transmitting information).  This insures optimal 
utilization of the information . . . .”44  Echoing Justice Brandeis’s 
eloquent views, ideas should be “free as the air to common use.”45 
With a price set at zero, ideas will be able to spread, and 
indeed, all can use the idea.  Arrow, though, quickly interjects 
that despite the appeal of this utopic public domain, such a 
scheme would “provide[] no incentive for investment in 
research.”46  No one would invest in producing ideas, because 
there would be no ability to recoup the costs.  Arrow then 
suggests that a property rights system can fix this:  “In a free 
enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the 
invention to create property rights; precisely to the extent that it 
is successful, there is an underutilization of the information.”47  
Arrow’s last statement gets at the core of the incentives versus 
access paradox.48  In essence, we need to block access so that 
price can be raised above marginal cost to ensure a positive 
incentive to initially create—or commercialize—the work; 
excluding some from use of the work is inefficient.  At present, 
the use of valuable societal resources is not being maximized.  
This is the well-known, deadweight loss cost often discussed in 
intellectual property debates. 
The first two pathologies of the inducement system 
addressed the lack of utilitarian tools for designing or assessing a 
reward-based patent system.  The exclusion fixation of the 
reward theory is somewhat different but nonetheless still 
damaging to any prospect of a stable, accepted system.  The 
reward via exclusion frame inherently leads to controversy 
because it necessarily incurs a real cost.  No one celebrates the  
 
 
 
44 Arrow, supra note 23, at 616–17. 
45 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
46 Arrow, supra note 23, at 617. 
47 Id. 
48 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access 
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 486 n.5 (1996). 
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exclusion of others from use of a productive idea, but the reward 
framing accepts this as an unfortunate but necessary feature of 
the system.49 
II. INNOVATION WITHOUT INDUCEMENT 
In his book, Merges eludes to some of the impossibility 
described above: 
“[T]his complexity poses a major problem for utilitarian theory.  
The sheer practical difficulty of measuring or approximating all 
the variables involved means that the utilitarian program will 
always be at best aspirational.  Like designing a perfect 
socialist economy, the computational complexities of this 
philosophical project cast grave doubt on its fitness as a 
workable foundation for the field.”50 
I agree completely with Merges here but for one important detail.  
He argues that this problem dooms “utilitarian theory.”  I 
disagree.  It dooms the particular framing that we have chosen.  
The above discussion focused on some key features of the 
conventional reward framing for the patent system.  That reward 
system provides a perverse framing “that resists evaluation.  We 
cannot establish the overall costs or benefits of the system.  We 
cannot prove it is worth it, nor can we prove it is not.  The system 
just endures in a persistent indeterminate state.”51  We have an 
unscientific system controlling a critical engine for economic 
growth.  If Lemley is serious in moving patent theory toward a 
scientific footing, I hope he is ready to ditch that standard 
incentive framing as well.  I think it is the only way we can hope 
to get there. 
 
49 Some have pointed to the potential for price discrimination to help reduce 
these deadweight losses and, indeed, where it can be employed, price discrimination 
will help, but, where it cannot be used, the reward framing still accepts exclusion as 
the proper outcome. See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual 
Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream 
Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 390, 422 (2006). In other words, because price 
discrimination increases the share of surplus that goes to the patentee, patentees 
have incentives to deploy price discrimination where they are able. If they cannot 
deploy it effectively, then the reward framing accepts exclusion as the correct 
outcome. 
50 MERGES, supra note 7, at 2–3. 
51 Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to Intellectual 
Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2012) [hereinafter Liivak, Maturing Patent 
Theory]. 
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As argued in this Essay, those problems stem rather directly 
from the framing.  Once it is decided that the purpose of the 
patent system is to induce inventive activity by granting rewards 
of valuable exclusive rights, the indeterminacy is baked in.  
Rather than lament the quagmire, it should be surprising that 
this system could have ever been justified on utilitarian grounds.  
Given this dour assessment, perhaps the patent system should be 
abandoned, or at least the utilitarian arguments in support of it.  
Either would be an understandable reaction.  Indeed, a number 
of patent scholars are exploring both of these options.  But there 
is another possibility.  Perhaps reward framing is not the only 
way to structure a utilitarian-justified patent system.  And if 
there are alternatives, they should be explored.  Moreover, as 
argued above, reward framing fails because it entails too many 
pathological features.  That failing suggests exploring 
alternatives that lack these problematic characteristics. 
A number of patent scholars have begun to work on a system 
that has promise in this regard.  Rather than focusing on 
delivering a reward for invention, scholars have instead been 
framing the patent system as the legal infrastructure that 
enables technology creators to sell their creations to technology 
users.52  A patent system based on enabling licensing of 
technology from patentees to technology users has the potential 
to provide the full basis for the patent system, as well as allow 
for robust, consensus-building utilitarian justification for it.53  In 
particular, this framing puts heavy emphasis on ex ante 
licensing—actual technology transfer—and has little room for ex 
 
52 See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 473, 489 (2005) (arguing from a transaction cost perspective that “[t]he patent 
form enables a potential transferor to share an information asset without fear of 
misappropriation while assembling the complex team necessary to commercialize a 
new product”); Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1499 (2005); Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent 
Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1174 (2008) (arguing 
that a transactional model “permit[s] the exposition of a model that need not rely on 
ex ante assumptions about optimal R&D expenditures”); Liivak, Maturing Patent 
Theory, supra note 51, at 1165; Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 
supra note 16, at 1343; Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating 
Standards for Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057, 1076 
(2013) (“As I will show, the modular theory of property points to a strong role for 
commercialization concerns to shape intellectual property.”); Stephen Yelderman, 
Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1566–67 (2016). 
53 See Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, supra note 16, at 1357–
58 (2013); Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory, supra note 51, at 1182. 
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post licensing.54  Notably, ex post licensing is the domain of 
patent trolls and therefore this tech transfer framing provides no 
support for the patent troll business model.  Furthermore, this 
framing can avoid the pathological pitfalls that have hampered 
the reward theory. 
Before exploring these solutions in more detail, it is worth 
pointing out that Merges and Lemley both provide hints 
suggesting that this direction may suit them.  Merges explores 
the impossibility of the regulatory incentive system and he 
rightly compares its informational complexity to the impossibility 
of “designing a perfect socialist economy.”55  This comparison 
surely suggests the consideration of a patent system modeled on 
private property and its system of exchange.  That private 
property system does not put impossible informational demands 
on system design.  This transactional theory is aiming to be 
exactly such a theory in the realm of ideas.  Similarly, though he 
seems unwilling to admit it,56 Lemley also hints that private 
property—and its attendant microeconomic theories—may 
provide the starting point for fruitful solutions.  After all, he 
premises much of his arguments on “the fundamental discovery 
that market mechanisms supplemented with some infrastructure 
investment and health and safety regulation generally work 
better than anything else in providing most goods and services.”57  
But those markets and the theories of perfect competition that he 
aims to protect are all predicated on a system of private property.  
Perhaps an analog theory for patents that rightfully recognizes 
the critical differences between rival and nonrival goods could be 
a step in the right direction.  Again, I think a transactional 
theory of technology transfer can be such a theory. 
A. A Neutral Platform for Enabling Technology Transfer 
The reward theory aims to draw people to the business of 
inventing.  Society worries that too few people will become 
inventors and thus, the conventional framing takes the most 
 
54 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 7–8, 31–72 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-
and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf. 
55 MERGES, supra note 7, at 3. 
56 See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1345. 
57 Id. at 1330. 
FINAL_LIIVAK 2/23/2017  4:45 PM 
656 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:639   
direct approach to getting people to become inventors.  Yet, as 
explained above, the direct approach leads to numerous 
unresolvable problems.  The alternative technology transfer 
regime takes a less direct approach.  It does not explicitly aim to 
make inventing a profitable activity for all inventors.  Rather, it 
simply provides the legal platform upon which inventors can sell 
their technologies to users.  As a platform, it is largely agnostic 
about how many people should take advantage of marketing 
inventions to users.  In other words, it does not aim to induce.  
Accordingly, such a system need not know beforehand—or even 
later to optimize it—how much inventive activity is optimal.  
Potential inventors and potential technology users will 
themselves decide when to use this platform. 
B. Exclusivity Not Exclusion 
As a patent system that emerges from the Patent and 
Copyright clause, the mode of “promoting progress” is limited to 
“exclusive rights.”58  In the reward theory, those rights are 
designed to exclude others from access.  For some, the right to 
exclude is tied directly to the constitutional mandate.59  And 
certainly the right to exclude is seen by many as the fundamental 
defining characteristic of property systems.60  Yet, other property 
scholars have offered an alternative understanding.  Property 
should focus on exclusivity rather than exclusion.61  For 
intellectual property that means focusing not on excluding others 
as is inherent in the reward framing, but instead to understand 
the intellectual property owner as holding an exclusive position 
in regards to the work in question.  For the technology transfer 
framing of the patent system, this exclusive position of the patent 
owner should be understood as the right—and obligation—to be 
the exclusive supplier of the patented invention to users of the 
invention. 
 
58 Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory, supra note 51, at 1180, 1185. 
59 See Roger Milgrim, An Independent Invention Defense to Patent Infringement: 
The Academy Talking to Itself: Should Anyone Listen?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 295, 297–98 (2008). 
60 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 730 (1998). 
61 Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 
275, 275 (2008). 
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C. Focus on Value of Use of Invention, Not Value of Exclusion 
Inventors will devote scarce resources to inventing when 
they believe there is a large enough market for the invention that 
the cumulative ex ante licensing revenue exceeds the opportunity 
costs of those consumed scarce resources.  In other words, people 
will invent when it is their best option.  Likewise, technology 
users will come to this market to get the new technology where 
the private value of using the new technology exceeds the value 
of the other things that could be bought with the asked-for 
licensing fee.  The utilitarian justification is straightforward.  If 
an inventor can stay in business by selling his or her inventions 
to others, then society concurs that the creation of the technology 
is the best use of scarce resources. 
CONCLUSION 
The current reward framing for the patent system has 
resisted all attempts to either confirm or to refute the benefits of 
the system.  Yet that should not surprise us.  We should be 
surprised that we ever thought that the system could be justified 
at all.  The reward framing has infected the patent system with 
pathological defects that make the system both unjustifiable and 
unfalsifiable.  An alternate framing that focuses on ex ante 
technology transfer can support and explain many of the 
doctrinal features of the current patent system, but it can do so 
while avoiding the pathologies that plague today’s patent theory. 
